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Authentication Algorithm for Portable Embedded 
Systems using PUFs 
Sunil Devidas Bobade α & Dr. Vijay R. Mankar σ 
Abstract- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are circuits 
that exploit chip-unique features to be used as signatures 
which can be used as good silicon biometrics. These 
signatures are based on semiconductor fabrication variations 
that are very difficult to control or reproduce. These chip-
unique signatures together with strong challenge-response 
authentication algorithm can be used to authenticate and 
secure chips. This paper expands the security avenues 
covered by PUF and FPGAs by introducing a new class of 
concept called “Soft PUFs.” This scheme propose robust 
challenge- response authentication solution based on a PUF 
device that provides stronger security guarantees to the user 
than what previously could be achieved. By exploiting the 
silicon uniqueness of each FPGA device and incorporating a 
special authentication algorithms in existing FPGA fabric, 
FPGA based embedded systems can be used for new 
security-oriented and network- oriented applications that were 
not previously possible or thought of. 
Keywords: trapdoor function, soft PUF, physical  
unclonable functions, challenge–response 
authentication.  
I. Introduction 
UF, is a trap door function physically blended or 
inscribed deep in system during manufacturing 
process and is easy to evaluate but hard to clone. 
Because of random process variations, no two 
Integrated Circuits even with the same layouts are 
identical.Variation is inherent in fabrication process or in 
areas environmental variations such as temperature, 
supply voltage and Electromagnetic interference, which 
can affect their performance and is hard to remove or 
predict. An untrusted foundry cannot create a copy of 
the circuit as it is impossible to control the 
manufacturing process variations. PUFs are highly 
secure and there are no need for trusted programming 
and are found to be inexpensive as there is no need of 
special fabrication technique PUF can enable a secure, 
low-cost authentication without crypto. 
“Security engineers face the seemingly 
contradictory challenge of providing lightweight 
cryptographic algorithms for strong authentication, 
encryption and other cryptographic services that can 
perform on a speck of dust.” [1]. Most of the traditional 
authentication schemes and encryption algorithms relies  
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on a unique ID or a secret key. They are usually 
generated and stored in a secure manner in non volatile 
storage on chip either in fuses or EEPROMs, protecting 
them from malicious attackers. However, these are 
susceptible to invasive and non invasive attacks like 
side channel attacks.  
Side channel attacks instead of testing the 
strength of the cryptographic algorithms and extract the 
information presented due to implementation 
weaknesses, instead extract vital information from the 
electrical characteristics of a chip such as power and 
timing which are data dependent. Hence, any hardware 
mechanism aiming to be robust should tackle and 
counter invasive and non invasive attacks.  
PUFs basically work on concept of challenge–
response authentication. When a physical stimulus is 
applied to the structure, it reacts in an unique way as a 
result of complex interaction of the stimulus with the 
physical microstructure of the device. This exact 
microstructure depends on physical factors introduced 
during manufacturing process. The device's identity is 
established and hidden in microstructure itself. As this 
structure is not directly revealed by the challenge-
response mechanism such a device is resistant to 
spoofing attacks. 
Unclonability means that each PUF device has 
a unique and unpredictable yet unique response to 
challenges. It is infeasible to construct a PUF with the 
same challenge–response behavior as another given 
PUF because exact control over the manufacturing 
process is infeasible. The combination of physical and 
mathematical unclonability renders a PUF truly 
unclonable. 
A distinction is made between PUFs in which 
physical randomness is explicitly introduced and used 
as an unique identification code. PUFs uses this very 
inherent to thwart attacks. 
The strength of a PUF is determined by three 
important parameters namely uniqueness, reliability and 
security. Uniqueness indicates the ability to distinguish 
between different ICs, measured by determining 
hamming distance between the responses obtained 
from different PUF instances. Reliability indicates that 
PUF circuit should be capable of reproducing CRPs in 
presence of noise and environmental variations. The 
security in PUFs indicates a PUF’s susceptibility to 
different types of modeling attacks. It should be 
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impossible to construct an exact replica of a PUF 
instance even with complete knowledge of the design. 
In the case of ASIC implementations, Hard 
PUFs are implemented directly into the ASIC silicon. By 
comparison, in the case of FPGAs, Soft PUFs are 
implemented using a small amount of the FPGA’s 
standard programmable resources, such as Lookup 
Tables, Registers, and Memories. 
II. Related Work 
Generally, there are three classes of PUF 
architectures namely cover-based PUF, delay-based 
PUF, and memory-based PUF. The first mention of PUF 
in the literature is that of optical PUF [2] which is cover-
based PUF, exploits the randomness in the light 
scattering particles and the complexity of the interaction 
between the laser and the particles. After that, several 
PUF hardware structures have been proposed [2–5]. 
Most PUFs use conventional silicon techniques so that 
they do not require any special fabrication process or 
treatment and can be easily integrated into IC chips. 
Silicon PUFs exploits manufacturing delay variation of 
wire to generate a unique challenge-response mapping 
for each IC. These unique properties of each IC are easy 
to measure through the circuits but hard to copy 
without. Unfortunately, recent analysis has 
demonstrated that those PUF structures are vulnerable 
to several attack methods including emulation, replay 
(man-in-the-middle attack), and reverse engineering [7]. 
Therefore, a dynamic PUF that can alter the CRPs every 
time the data is modified to prevent the hidden 
information leaked out is very desirable. Memory-based 
PUFs exploit the vulnerable balance of SRAM cross-
coupled transistors. Uncontrollable random SRAM 
contents can be generated during power-up. The 
random contents are then used as PUF signature [6] 
[7]. The drawback of memory-based PUF is that every 
memory element generates a fixed one bit signature. 
Multi-factor authentication protocols, which often use a 
password and a mobile device, have been explored in 
prior literature [8,9,10]. 
III. Proposed Soft Puf Scheme 
In this paper we describe authentication 
solution based on a PUF device that provide stronger 
security environment. Each user is issued a PUF that 
aids in authentication and cannot be copied or cloned. 
The scheme works on three underlying principle that 
anyone with complete access to the authentication data 
at the server side and the device itself is still unable to 
impersonate the user. 
There are three principal entities in the scheme: 
server S (or another entity authenticating the user on 
behalf of the server), user U, and device D. Before 
authentication can take place, the user obtains a device 
with a PUF built into it and enrols himself with the aid of 
Register  protocol with the server. Once the registration 
is complete, the user will be able to authenticate with the 
help of the device. 
a) Register:  is a process between S and U, where the 
user U registers with the server with the aid of D. If 
enrolment is successful, the server obtains and 
stores a token credU that can be used in 
subsequent authentications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Authentication: is a process between S and U, 
where U uses D and S uses its stored credentials 
credU to make its decision to either accept or reject 
the user. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In proposed scheme, nowhere it is required to 
place any sensitive information on the device, to 
eliminate any possibility of data compromise In fact, our 
protocols do not require the device to store any 
information not related to the PUF functionality, which 
strengthens our design.
 
Register : 
1. Server S sends challenge c to user U along 
with description of the group Gq, consisting  
of a pair (p,q), and its generator g. 
2. User U sends H(c||pwd), Gq, g, where 
pwd is a user password, to device D for a 
modified Gen protocol. 
3. Device D calculates a challenge d = 
H(H(c||pwd), Gq, g) and runs Gen on this 
value to obtain response r,P, D then sends to 
the user (gr,P). 
 
        
       
Authentication : 
1. Server S sends challenge c, Gq, g, P, and a 
nonce N to the user U. 
2. U sends (H(c||pwd), Gq_,g,P,N) to device 
D for Rep protocol. 
3. DeviceD calculates a challenge d 
=H(H(c||pwd),g, p) and runs Rep on this 
value 
to obtain response r. D chooses a random 
value v ∈ Zq and calculates t = gv. D 
then calculates c_ = H(g,gr, t,N) and w = 
v−c_r mod q, and sends c_,w to the U. 
4. User U sends these values to the server S. S 
calculates t_ = gwgrc_ 
and accepts the authentication if c_ = H(g,gr, 
t_,N), and otherwise rejects the value. 
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There is a strong possibility that an adversary 
can clone the PUF by obtaining the PUFs response to a 
challenge, and then build a piece of software that 
impersonates the user. To mitigate this software cloning 
attack, proposed scheme requires the authenticator to 
always have physical access to the PUF in order to 
authenticate. 
IV. New Application Areas 
Wide spectrum of security oriented applications 
is now available for soft PUFs to be grabbed. Here are 
the few applications. 
a) Deployment of Keyed Applications 
Currently, in devices such as Xilinx Virtex-4 and 
Virtex-5, there exists battery-backed key that is used to 
store Bitstream decryption key. This key cannot be 
accessed from the programmable fabric. By 
incorporating Soft PUFs into these devices, system 
designer can now deploy cryptographic keys/seeds on 
FPGAs.  
b) Activation or deactivation  
Different features in FPGA-based can be 
activated, with activation rights blended in FPGA silicon 
die. Features like software / firmware running on FPGA-
based systems, different modules or features within 
software / firmware, or remote commands that are 
directed for a particular FPGA-based system can be 
made chip specific. This is more secure than traditional 
anchoring methods such as use of USB dongle, MAC 
addresses, or similar technologies. 
c) Cloning or Counterfeit Detection of FPGA Silicon 
Soft PUFs can be used to counter chip 
counterfeiting or chip cloning. They can be used, for 
example, to make sure that FPGAs purchased through 
distributors or secondary markets are in fact authentic 
and are shipped by actual manufacturing firm.  
V. Conclusion 
With Soft PUFs, system designers have a new 
primitive to increase and enhance application space of 
FPGA-based designs. By having ability to authenticate 
FPGAs at device level, and ability to store “volatile” keys 
in these devices, FPGAs have the potential to venture 
into yet more security applications areas.  
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